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COMBATING THE LURE OF IMPROPRIETY IN
PROFESSIONAL SPORTS INDUSTRIES: THE
DESIRABILITY OF TREATING A PLAYBOOK AS
A LEGALLY ENFORCEABLE TRADE SECRET
I. INTRODUCTION

In the 2000 National Football League Super Bowl, the Tennessee Titans failed
to succeed on a last second play call as the offensive receiver caught a pass just
inches shy of the goal line. "Eighteen more inches, or five more seconds, and [he]
would have had the ball in the end zone."' The Titans might have won the Super
Bowl with a more creative, surprising play. The failure of this final play may have
cost the organization thousands of dollars.
Did anyone ever consider whether the St. Louis Rams might have known what
play the Titans had called? Of course, nothing indicates that the St. Louis
organization was engaged in any impropriety. Perhaps the Rams' final defensive
play merely resulted from a great coaching call by Rams' head coach Mike Martz.
Maybe the offensive player simply ran his route too short of the goal line, or
maybe the defensive player made an incredible athletic move to tackle the ball
carrier short of the end zone. Still, is it not possible that the Titans might have
been the victim of playbook misappropriation? In other words, what if someone
had known the Titans' secret playbook information? What if someone had
known the crux of a successful final play that could have won the Rams
organization thousands of dollars? Certainly no one enjoys a skeptic, but
oftentimes this sort of skepticism breeds innovation in legal thinking.
Businesses constantly create, plan, produce, reproduce, and formulate
strategies in order to gain a competitive advantage over others in the marketplace.
Companies seek the protection of intellectual property laws to secure proprietary
rights in their innovations.2 The benefits of that protection stem from the rights
of exclusion afforded by intellectual property law.' The right to prevent others
from gaining or using information can foster economic success and

' Tom Scocca, A Stper Bowl, at http://www.citypaper.com/2000-02-02/upper.html

(Feb. 2,

2000).
2

Linda B. Samuels & Bryan K. Johnson, The Uniform Trade Secrets Act. The States'Response, 24

CREIGHTON L. REV. 49, 49 (1990).
MARGRETH BARRETT, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: CASES AND MATERIALS 15 (2d ed. 2001)
(citing Metro. Opera Ass'n, Inc. v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 101 N.Y.S.2d 483,87 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 173 (1950)).
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advancement. 4 Nowhere is this more true than in the world of professional
sports.
While scholars, academics, and professors have debated the expansion of
intellectual property doctrines into the sacred realm of gaming and sporting
activities, common law state protections have been increasingly supplanted by
federal legislative acts encouraging public disclosure, registration, or notice.'
Thus, the once prominent field of trade secret law, a creature of state law, has6
receded to make way for copyright, patent, and trademark protections.
Nevertheless, professional sports playbooks may become an exception to the
general trend toward providing these forms of federal protection. After all, the
crux of trade secret law seems to rest on one plainly intuitive premise: that the
most valuable information a person can own is that which no one else knows.
Due to registration requirements, copyright and patent law are fundamentally
incapable of embracing this element of secrecy.' Herein lies the appeal of trade
secret law for those seeking protection of sports playbooks.
"In the NFL, playbooks are treated like trade secrets."' Whether and how a
court might actually apply trade secret law to playbooks, however, remains a
matter of speculation. This Note, therefore, addresses the potential application
of modem trade secret law to pre-designed, scripted sports playbooks. Part II
provides a background perspective on trade secret law and focuses on its
evolution from common law origins to its present form under the Uniform Trade
Secrets Act9 (UTSA). Part III discusses professional sports and the technical
aspects of scripted football playbooks relevant to an analysis under the UTSA.
Part IV evaluates the specific elements of trade secret protection and argues in
favor of trade secret protection for playbooks by applying relevant case examples
pertaining to misappropriation causes of action. Part V presents a practical look
at conflicts that may arise in the professional football industry and suggests
potential solutions that could be implemented to facilitate and administer trade
secret protection. Finally, Part VI identifies a substantive policy justification for
extending trade secret protection to sports playbooks, placing particular emphasis
on future incentives for competition and entertainment within the professional
sports industries.

Samuels & Johnson, supra note 2, at 49.
See ,general4 HENRY H. PERRITF, JR., PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, TRADE SECRETS: A
PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE, 33-64 (2002) (discussing federal intellectual property statutes and
recognizing that trade secret law is now largely preempted by federal copyright or patent protection).
6Id
Id at 39 (contrasting various levels of disclosure under patent, copyright, and trade secret law).
then posted on Internet, SI.COM, Apr. 5, 2002, availabl at
See Interception: MiamipLqybooks itolen
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/football/college/news/2002/04/04/miami-playbook-ap/.
9 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT (amended 1985) (2002).
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The analysis contained herein certainly will not exhaust the arguments
concerning IP protection of professional sports plays, but hopefully will inspire
the legal community to consider, if not recognize, the desirability of treating a
professional playbook as a business secret. Furthermore, recognition of trade
secret protection in this area would surely deter improper conduct and provide
incentives for originality, creativity, and fair competition in the professional sports
world.
II.

TRADE SECRET LAW: A BACKGROUND PERSPECTIVE

"Trade secret law is the oldest form of intellectual property protection."' It
affords developers of useful commercial information a civil remedy against
anyone who wrongfully obtains and uses that business secret. 1 Initially, trade
secret law developed through state court decisions.' 2 Each state created its own
substantive body of trade secret doctrine that was modeled, to various degrees,
on the Restatement of Torts.' 3 Thus, unlike patent and copyright law, which are
the most common forms of intellectual property protection, a comprehensive
federal statute does not control trade secret law.' 4 Instead, trade secret regulation
that encompassed an almost
originated from state common law principles
1 s
unlimited realm of protectable information.
Unlike federal intellectual property rights secured under the copyright, patent,
or trademark statutes, the basis for trade secret protection is non-disclosure. 6 No
requirement of notice, registration, or deposit exists for trade secrets since the
value of the information itself originates from the fact that it is not readily
known.' 7 Trade secret law thereby acknowledges that companies regularly seek
to maintain their most valuable information in confidence so that they may
maintain a competitive advantage over their rivals;' the secret is the business

10 PERRITI,
"
2

supranote 5, at 1.

Id
Samuels & Johnson, supra note 2, at 49. See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S.

470,493 (1974) (holding that Ohio trade secret law was not preempted by federal patent law).
13Samuels & Johnson, supra note 2, at 49-50.
,Id at 50.
15See id at 49; PERRITr, sapranote 5, at 79-81 (noting the broad subject matter covered by trade
secret law).
t6 See PERR1rr, smpranote 5, at 1-26 (emphasis supplied) (introducing fundamental concepts of
trade secret law).
I? Id at 33-64.
IS Samuels & Johnson, smpra note 2, at 49 ("The ability to sustain investment in research and
development in a competitive environment is dependent to a large extent upon a company's ability
to protect its proprietary information. For many companies, trade secrets are the most valuable form
of proprietary information.").
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advantage. A business considering investing in innovation generally has three
options: (1) work only on innovations that will qualify for federal protection; (2)
work on innovations that, once created, will be made public without federal
protection; or (3) work on innovations that lack federal protection but, once
created, will be kept secret." Professional sports franchises may greatly benefit
from a workable system of trade secret doctrine protecting innovations in the
third category. 20
All state trade secret laws originate from one, or a combination, of three
specific sources of legal doctrine: section 757 of the Restatement (First) of
Torts, a' section 39 of the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition,22 and the
Uniform Trade Secrets Act.23 Under all three doctrines, the cause of action
referred to as trade secret misappropriation provides the basis for recovery against
competitors who improperly violate a valid trade secret. 24 "The cause of
action ...was imported from English common law to American common law in
a series of midnineteenth century decisions by the highest courts of several
eastern states." 25 While there is considerable theoretical debate over whether
misappropriation is properly characterized as a tort or property remedy, the
practical application is the same.26

"James R. McKown, Taking Property ConstitutionalRamifcationsofLitigationInolving Trade Secrets,
RICHARD MILLER, LEGAL ASPECTS OF TECHNOLOGY
UTILIZATION 12-14 (1974)).
20 The pros and cons of applying trade secret protection to sports playbooks from a policy
perspective are developed more fully in Part VI of this Note.
21 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 (1939).
2 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 (1995).
2 See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT (2002). See also PERRrrr, supra note 5, at 9 ("Lawyers and
judges dealing with trade secret misappropriation disputes can look to multiple sources of law to
resolve the disputes: the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, the Restatement (Third) of Unfair
Competition, the Restatement of Torts, federal law, other types of intellectual property law, and
general policy objectives."); Samuels & Johnson, spra note 2, at 49-92 (discussing the lack of
uniformity in state trade secret law due to the influence of various common law authority).
24 PERRrrr, spra note 5, at 3-6.
' Christopher Rebel J. Pace, The Casefora FederalTrade Secrets Act, 8 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 427,
Vickery v. Welch, 36 Mass. 523 (1837) (finding that under a bond to convey
427-28 (1995). See, e.g.,
and assure, an obligor must convey the exclusive right and secret art of making chocolate); McGowin
v.Remington, 12 Pa. 56 (1849) (discussing monetary compensation for detention of personal
chattels); Taylor v. Blanchard, 95 Mass. 370 (1866) (concerning the enforceability of a non-compete
contract between manufacturers in the shoe-cutter trade); Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452 (1868)
(discussing a contract for machinery secretly invented for making gunny cloth by a secret process).
' Pace, spranote 25, at 428.

13 REv. LITG. 253, 256-57 (1994) (citing
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RESTATEMENT OF TORTS

§ 757

Until the 1970s, section 757 of the Restatement (First) of Torts provided the
only uniformly-recognized definition of a trade secret:27 "A trade secret may
consist of any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is
used in one's business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an
advantage over competitors who do not know or use it."'28 Comment b to section
757 further elaborates that a trade secret "may be a formula for a chemical
compound, a process of manufacturing, treating or preserving materials, a pattern
for a machine or other device, or a list of customers."'29 Comment b goes on to
explain the importance of maintaining secrecy and the need for continuous use
of the secret in the operation of the business.' Specifically, it provides:
The subject matter of a trade secret must be secret.... [A] substantial element of secrecy must exist, so that, except by the use of
improper means, there would be difficulty in acquiring the information. An exact definition of a trade secret is not possible. Some
factors to be considered in determining whether given information
is one's trade secret are: (1) the extent to which the information is
known outside of his business; (2) the extent to which it is known
by employees and others involved in his business; (3) the extent of
measures taken by him to guard the secrecy of the information; (4)
the value of the information to him and to his competitors; (5) the
amount of effort or money expended by him in developing the
information; (6) the ease or difficulty with which the
information
31
could be properly acquired or duplicated by others.
Even when a trade secret exists, mere possession of the information by an
outsider does not necessarily constitute misappropriation.32 In order for
misappropriation to occur, the Restatement of Torts requires an improper or
mistaken disclosure:
One who discloses or uses another's trade secret, without a privilege
to do so, is liable to the other if: (a) he discovered the secret by

21 1 ROGER M. MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS
23 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939).

§ 1.01 [11,

at 1-4 (2003).

29Id
30

Id.

32

See Pace, supra note 25, at 431.
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improper means, or (b) his disclosure or use constitutes a breach of
confidence reposed in him by the other in disclosing the secret to
him, or (c) he learned the secret from a third person with notice of
the facts that it was a secret and that the third person discovered it
by improper means or that the third person's disclosure of it was
otherwise a breach of his duty to the other, or (d) he learned the
secret with notice of the facts that it 33was a secret and that its
disclosure was made to him by mistake.
Thus, the Restatement makes clear that a trade secret misappropriation claim only
exists if one can establish (1) that he possesses a business secret that affords an
economic advantage and (2) that misappropriation of that secret has occurred.'
Portions of comment b have been cited approvingly in virtually every U.S.
jurisdiction.3"
B. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION 5 39

While section 757 of the Restatement (First) of Torts was almost unanimously
accepted as the fundamental basis for trade secret law, the reporters of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts omitted numerous sections of the original
Restatement on the grounds that the subject matter fell outside traditional tort
law.36 The Reporters recognized the rapid development of the doctrines of unfair
competition and trade regulation into independent bodies of law and decided that
the subject of trade secrets would be more appropriately treated elsewhere.3 7 That
"elsewhere" was the then-projected Restatement of the Law of Unfair Competition.3" Although the UTSA had already been adopted by forty-one states and the
District of Columbia at the time these sections of the Restatement were released,
a comprehensive trade secret analysis would be incomplete without at least
mentioning this source of trade secret doctrine.
The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition provides a broad definition
of a trade secret. Section 39 states that: "[A] trade secret is any information that

31 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS

§ 757

cmt. b.

' See Camp Creek Hospitality Inns, Inc. v. Sheraton Franchise Corp., 139 F.3d 1396, 1410, 46
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1677, 1688 (11 th Cir. 1998) (recognizing that this general framework has been
carried over from the common law to the UTSA).
" See MILGRIM, supranote 27, § 1.01 [11]
at 1-5 (citing case law from thirty-four states and every
federal circuit that has approved of section 757 comment b).
1J S 1.01[1] at 1-19.
" RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS % 1-2 (1979).

3 MILGRIM, supra note 27, § 1.01 [4] at 1-136.18-19 (referring to the RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS).
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can be used in the operation of a business or other enterprise and that is
sufficiently valuable and secret to afford an actual or potential economic
advantage over others."39 Thus, while section 39 represents a broad, encompassing definition of trade secret information, section 757 of the Restatement of Torts
provides a very narrow statement of specific material qualifying for protection.
The inconsistency between these two approaches may suggest why courts have
routinely preferred the statutory protections set forth by the UTSA.
Section 40 discusses appropriation in the following way:
One is subject to liability for the appropriation of another's trade
secret if:
(a) the actor acquires by means that are improper under the rule
stated in § 3 information that the actor knows or should know is
the other's trade secret by means that are improper... ; or
(b) the actor uses or discloses the other's trade secret without the
other's consent and, at the time of the use or disclosure,
(1) the actor knows or has reason to know that the information is a trade secret that the actor acquired under circumstances creating a duty of confidence owed by the actor to the
other... ; or
(2) the actor knows or has reason to know that the information is a trade secret that the actor acquired by means that are
improper... ; or
(3) the actor knows or has reason to know that the information is a trade secret that the actor acquired from or through
a person who acquired it by means that are improper.., or
whose disclosure of the trade secret to the actor constituted a
breach of a duty of confidence owed to the other ... ; or
(4) the actor knows or has reason to know that the information is a trade secret that the actor acquired through an
accident or mistake unless the acquisition was the result of the
other's failure to take reasonable precautions to maintain the
secrecy of the information.'
C. UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT

The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
recognized the growing importance of trade secret protection for setting

" RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 (1995).
40

Id % 39-40.
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standards of ethical behavior in the marketplace.4 1 Thus, the Uniform Trade
Secrets Act was commissioned, recommended for enactment in all states in 1979,
and approved by the American Bar Association in 1980.42 Although this uniform
statutory approach has proven revolutionary in modern application (like the
Uniform Commercial Code), the National Conference did not radically alter the
existing common law standards for trade secret misappropriation. Instead, it
simply codified these standards to introduce a uniform approach to trade secret
law among the states.43
Two versions of the UTSA were adopted: the original in 1979 and an
amended form in 1985." For the purpose of this discussion, the two versions are
virtually identical and will be addressed collectively as the 1985 UTSA. States'
enactment of the UTSA in various versions represented the first major attempt
at legislating trade secret misappropriation-a satisfying departure from reliance
4s
on the courts for often inconsistent guidance.
The UTSA does not replace existing state law. Rather, it is designed to
supplement the common law foundation with a more precise framework for
evaluating potential business secrets.46 Section 1 of the UTSA defines trade secret
in the following way:
[I]nformation, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program,
device, method, technique, or process, that: (i) derives independent
economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known
to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other
persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use,
and (ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the
circumstances to maintain its secrecy.47

4 See generaI Ramon A. Klitzke, The Unifrwe Trade Secrets At, 64 MARQ. L REV. 277 (1980),
reprinted in 80 PAT. & TRADEMARK REV. 157 (1982).
2 MILGRIM, smpra note 27, § 1.01 [2J at 1-21.
4 See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS AcT prefatory note, 14 U.L.A. 369 (1985).
44 See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS AcT prefatory note, 14 U.L.A. 433 (1985). The 1985 amendments
appear to establish additional remedies available for trade secret misappropriation and clarify existing
provisions for injunctive relief, damages, and impact on other relevant laws.
45 See Pace, supra note 25, at 433 n.19 (citing Samuels & Johnson, supra note 2, at 49).
* See Samuels &Johnson, supranote 2, at 53 (arguing that the UTSA draws upon many of the
Restatement of Torts section 757 concepts, yet ventures far beyond the guidance of the Restatement
in attempting to resolve inconsistencies that permeated judicial decisions based on common law
principles).
17 UNIF.

TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (2002).
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Section 1(2) provides a fairly broad definition of misappropriation as:
(i) acquisition of a trade secret of another by a person who knows
or has reason to know that the trade secret was acquired by
improper means; or (ii) disclosure or use of a trade secret of another
without express or implied consent by a person who
(A) used improper means to acquire knowledge of the trade
secret; or
(B) at the time of disclosure or use, knew or had reason to know
that his knowledge of the trade secret was (I) derived from or
through a person who had utilized improper means to acquire it;
() acquired under circumstances giving rise to a duty to maintain
its secrecy or limit its use; or (II1) derived from or through a
person who owed a duty to the person seeking relief to maintain
its secrecy or limit its use; or
(C) before a material change of his position, knew or had reason
to know that it was a trade secret and that knowledge of it had
been acquired by accident or mistake."s
While section 1(4) uses the words "compilation," "program," "device,"
"method," and "technique" in defining "trade secret," thereby deviating from the
definitions employed by the Restatement of Torts and the Restatement of Unfair
Competition, "the structure of the definition indicates that these terms are not
meant to limit the concept. 4 9 Still, differences in the definitions do exist. The
comment to section 1(4) points out that a significant distinction between it and
the Restatement of Torts definition is the abandonment of the requirement that
the trade secret be "continuously used in one's business.""0 Also, an obvious
difference between the definitions of the UTSA and the Restatement of Unfair
Competition is that the UTSA provides specific categories of material that will
qualify for protection, instead of merely using the open-ended term "any
5
information."'
Although a small minority of states still prefer the original approach contained
in the First Restatement of Torts, 2 an overwhelming majority of states have

48 Id

§ 1(2).

49 PERRITT, supra note 5, at 81.
so Id (referring to UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT S 1(4) cmt).

" CoMpare UNIF. TRADE SECRETS AcT § 1(4) (2002), aitb RESTATEMENT

(THIRD) OF UNFAIR

§ 39

(1995).
s2 Several states still pattern their trade secret laws after section 757 and have not adopted a
version of the UTSA: Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, and Texas. See
MILGRIM, supra note 27, § 1.01 [2) b.
COMPETITION
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currently adopted the UTSA in some form or another.5 3 The Restatement of
simply as
Unfair Competition's approach seems to be relied upon by attorneys
54
law.
common
the
from
originating
authority
additional persuasive
D. TRADE SECRETS AND FEDERAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAWS

Copyright and patent law protect innovations via congressional legislation, but
as discussed above, trade secret law is a creature of state common law and
legislation. Substantively, several distinctions exist between federal copyright and
patent protections and state trade secret protections. For example, unlike
copyright law, information can qualify as a trade secret even if it has never been
written down; no "fixation" is required."5 Unlike patent protection, trade secret
law neither requires that the information be novel, nor conditions protection on
registration and public deposit of a sample of the innovation. 6 Most importantly,
the content and duration of a trade secret is potentially unlimited. 7 Thus, the
potential scope of trade secret protection is much broader than both copyright
and patent law."
One commentator, Proloy K. Das, has evaluated the potential application of
federal IP laws to individual scripted sports plays (as opposed to playbooks), 9
His findings suggest that copyright or patent law protections could provide a
workable system in theory.' As Mr. Das also recognizes, however, practical
difficulties of disclosure and administration might ultimately undermine the spirit
of the game if playbook protection were sought under copyright and patent
laws. 6 Given this concern, sports leagues, public consumers, and the courts have
understandably shunned the idea of trade secret protection in the professional

s As of mid-2002, forty-three states and the District of Columbia, including the Eleventh
Circuit states of Alabama, Florida, and Georgia, adhered to the UTSA approach: See CAL. CIVIL
CODE (West 1997), 235 tbl. 5, "Table of Jurisdictions Wherein Act Has Been Adopted." See also
MILGRIM, supra note 27, § 1.01 121[b].
s4See MILGRIM, supra note 27, § 1.01 [4] ('While the Restatement has made a well-intentioned
stab at restating the law,.. . it remains to be seen whether [this provision] ... will materially affect
application of individual state UTSA statutes.").
ssPERRrrr, supra note 5, at 83.
s Id at 84-104.
IId at 79 ("The subject matter of trade secret is almost unlimited.").
s8Id at 79-84.
s See general4Proloy K. Das, Note, Offensive Protection: The PotenialAppkcationoflntellectualPropeily
Law to ScptedSpors Plys, 75 IND. L.J. 1073 (2000).
60 Id at 1096-97.
61 Id at 1075, 1088-94 (identifying potential problems with copyright or patent protection from
practical and legal standpoints).
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sports world.62 In light of this hesitation, this Note analyzes the professional
sports industry from the perspective of the National Football League 63 and offers
a practical solution in the form of state trade secret protection for teams' scripted
playbooks.
III. WHAT IS A SCRIPTED, PRE-DESIGNED SPORTS PLAYBOOK?
THE NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE EXAMPLE

The National Football League ("NFL") is "full of grown men playing a boy's
game for a tycoon's fortune."' Professional football is a business. Franchises
buy stadiums, sell tickets, pay salaries to players, coaches, and assistants, sell
broadcasting rights to television stations, sell advertising rights to marketers,
design logos, create uniforms, and license rights to clothing designers and vending
suppliers." Like all other businesses, NFL teams compete in a market to
outperform each other in hopes of achieving public notoriety and earning
substantial profits. When the team wins, the franchise as a whole wins. Players
and coaches may get new contracts with higher salaries, and owners profit from
increased marketing exposure through television,66 radio, advertising, and other
associated sales.67 If a team continuously succeeds against its opponents, the team
may even enjoy a profitable trip to the Super Bowl.6
Successful coaching is one key to winning games in the NFL. Successful
coaching means, in part, having an experienced coach and talented players. More
importantly though, a team needs a game plan for approaching upcoming games.
The game plan revolves around the creation, design, and scripting of specific plays
to be run in a certain game against a particular opponent.69 These plays are

62 See id at 1088 (noting that protection of a team playbook may offend "the very notion of fair
play that sports aim to instill").
63 The NFL sports industry offers the most appropriate case study for illustration due to the

highly visible nature of the sport, the widespread use of tangible playbooks by all teams, and the
importance of secret play-calling to a team's success against its opponents.
JOE THEISMAN, THE COMPLETE IDIOT'S GUIDE TO FOOTBALL 51 (2d ed. 2001).
6s See idat 256-58 (discussing commercial aspects of professional football).
See HOWIE LONG, FOOTBALL FOR DuMMIES 294 (1998) ("The total obligation of FOX, CBS,
ABC, and ESPN for the 1998 season [was] $2.2 billion. Now you can understand why Super Bowl
commercials are priced at $1.3 million per 30 seconds.").
67 See THEISMAN, supra note 64, at 256 (explaining how the number of team wins influences
salaries and profits); Das, supranote 59, at 1099 (noting that football team wins translate into media
exposure valued at tremendous amounts).
61 See Das, supra note 59, at 1099 (noting the financial rewards of a Super Bowl appearance).
69 See THEISMAN, supranote 64, at 52-53 (explaining that scripting the plays refers to the design
of a detailed list of plays that are drawn up in team playbooks and which are designed to cover every
possible scenario or situation that can occur in a game).
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formally memorialized in playbooks and practiced in advance by the players who
execute them during the games."0 The coaching staff decides when to utilize
certain plays at different points in the game."1 The compilation 2of these predesigned plays is known to as a playbook of scripted sports plays.
An individually scripted play is the combined movement of the eleven
participants on the field for one team at one point in time. 3 This entails the total
pattern of each player's actions in relation to the movements of others on the
team. 4 Scripted plays are pre-designed, orchestrated events that are created in
preparation for an upcoming game. In general, an individual play is secretly
developed in collaboration with other assistants within the team organization,
introduced in practice sessions to those players who will carry out the play, and
ultimately included in a formal playbook.7 5
Coaches spend a great deal of time developing new plays, studying old
playbooks, researching opposing teams, and analyzing their own team's skills.
Coaches often reuse plays that have proven successful against specific
opponents. 6 In other instances, coaches create new plays in the few days leading
up to a particular game.7 7 Moreover, a coach essentially designs a method of
reaching a certain result on the field. On offense, the desired result is to score
points, but on defense, the desired result is to prevent scoring. The coach
evaluates the talent level of players on his or her team and analyzes the strengths
and weaknesses of opponents; he or she then uses this information to craft
successful plays. "When football teams... decide which play or formation to use,
they base the decision on the personnel matchups they want. Coaches study the
opposition, examining hours of film, hoping to find the weak links. ..."78

70 d
7t Id
72 Id

73 Id at 53-54 (arguing that the idea of creating scripted football plays is commonly thought to
have originated under the West Coast Offense game plan of Bill Walsh, who designed a set of fifteen
plays to be introduced at pre-determined times for each upcoming game). Seegeneralb The Unoffida
Website ofthe West Coast Offense, at http://www.westcoastoffense.com (last visited Nov. 7, 2002).
' See Das, sufra note 59, at 1090.
A play, in diagram form, essentially tells a player how and when to move
throughout the course of the play. For example, the wide receiver is told to run
a post or an out on a certain count and at a certain pace, with his teammates each
receiving similar instructions regarding their actions during the play.... As such,
this constitutes protection for human movement through space.
Id
s Id at 1090-93 (discussing the origin of plays and playbooks).
76id at 1092-93.
" LONG, supra note 66, at 123.
7s Id at 122.
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An individual play is a method of advancing the ball downfield or a process
for obtaining a score.79 A play includes the formation of players on the field
before the series of movements for that play begins and contains the combined
movements of all eleven players for the duration of the play. It concludes when
each player's assignment has ended. Thus, it is this series of actions as a whole
that is the key to a particular play's success.' The ingenuity of the coach and
players is what makes the next scripted play better than the last. No single play
will necessarily succeed against any one defense, at any one time, against any one
team. "It isn't just a matter of figuring out which plays to call, but when. It's a
psychological war with the other coach."'"
A play is neither one formation nor just an individual player's athletic move.
A play does not account for incidental uncertainties that may occur during
execution such as opposing players falling down or missing tackles. Furthermore,
a specific, magic number of plays that are to be created for a particular game does
not exist. Most importantly, plays depend on timing. The design includes
information pertaining to when particular plays will be utilized. The plays are
scripted to include a combination of movement from the time of the break of the
huddle (before the snap), to the audible calls made by the quarterback at the line
of scrimmage, and then to the specific patterns of runs, blocks, cuts, and turns
made until the play is whistled dead by an official.8 2 Determining when each
particular element of this sequence of events should occur is part of the creative
process. The element of surprise is often the key to the success of a particular
play. The secret nature of the playbook thus creates the competitive advantage
for the team. 3

79 See Das, supra note 59, at 1089 (recognizing that a sports play can fall under the category of
a process or business method, as a football team is a business entity with departments that use these
methods to reach a specific purpose on the field).

goId

64, at 53.
AMERICAN FOOTBALL COACHES ASSOCIATION, OFFENSIVE FOOTBALL STRATEGIES 3-9
(2000) (discussing the importance of athletic players, execution of pre-designed plays, and the
absence of mistakes, penalties, accidents, or injuries during the occurrence of the play to the overall
success of scripted plays). This Note focuses only on the aspects of the play design and timing, as
the above-mentioned events will always be unforeseeable in particular instances.
" Therefore, the elements of each scripted play and the order in which a series of plays are
employed, both as predetermined by the coaches and in response to unexpected variables which
occur during the game, comprise a business secret that ideally creates a competitive advantage.
81 THEISMAN, sfipra note

"
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CAN A PLAYBOOK BE A TRADE SECRET UNDER THE LAW?:
THE APPLICATION OF TRADE SECRET DOCTRINE TO

PROFESSIONAL SPORTS PLAYBOOKS

Over the past 125 years, the basic elements of trade secret protection have
experienced little change." For this reason, a modem-day trade secret analysis not
only involves examination of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act but also draws upon
policies and theories formulated at common law for guidance."5 Additionally,
policies underlying other areas of intellectual property law are relevant. For
example, intellectual property scholars frequently profess the breadth of IP law
by noting that "Congress intended statutory subject matter to 'include anything
under the sun that is made by man' "6 and that copyright law extends to the
bounds of an author's creative expression. Trade secret protection must be
approached with this same level of open-mindedness. As an analogue to the
aforementioned cich&s of other areas of intellectual property law, Professor
Perritt has expressed that, in general, any subject matter is eligible for trade secret
protection as long as it gives "a competitive advantage because it is secret.""
The first step in any trade secret analysis is to determine what type of
information may be protected. 9 Next, the economic value of the information
must be assessed in order to determine whether others in the field could take
advantage of such value through proper means of legal appropriation.9 Finally,
whether conscious efforts have been made to maintain the secrecy of the
information should be considered; without such efforts, a trade secret will not
exist. 9'
A. SUBJECT MATTER

Playbooks contain secret business information that can be protected under
prevailing trade secret law. The UTSA specifically describes the subject matter
of trade secret protection with the following definition: " 'trade secret' means
information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method,

$ PERRITr, supra note
Bs Id[

5, at 26.

' Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175,182,209 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1,6 (1981) (citing S. REP. No. 82-

1979, at 5 (1952), repninedin 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394 (referring to the Patent Act of 1952)).
87 See BARRETr, supra note 3, at
404.
68 PERRITT,supra note 5, at 4.
"' Seeid at 82 (noting that whether information constitutes a trade secret is usually characterized
as a question of fact).
90 UNIF. TRADE SecRETS AcT § 1 (2002).
91 Id
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technique, or process ... "" The realm of information that may be protected
under this UTSA definition is conceivably unlimited. After all, the idea of
business "information" is an inherently broad concept. For guidance, the statute
provides the aforementioned eight general categories of information that may be
protected as trade secrets.93 Furthermore, courts in virtually every jurisdiction
have recognized, either expressly or impliedly, certain types of information that
necessarily are secret, have value, and afford a competitive advantage due to the
nature of the information itself in relation to business objectives.94 Because an
exact definition of trade secret subject matter is not possible, judicial evaluations
as to how certain trade information furthers business objectives are illustrative.
No judicial analysis has ever addressed trade secret protection for sports
plays, 5 and accordingly, this issue would be one of first impression for a court.96
This should not, however, discourage its exploration. Because scripted sports
plays are similar to other types of secret business information that have been
protected under the law, the availability of protection for playbooks merits
consideration.
Playbooks contain proprietary business information in the form of detailed
descriptions of routes, blocks, cuts, runs, and formations that are to take place at
designated times in a game. Under the UTSA definition, plays are arguably
methods, techniques, or processes for reaching a goal, and playbooks contain
secret information that can provide the means for obtaining a desired end result.
If the designed play is executed properly, it may advance the goals of the business
(i.e., moving the ball downfield, scoring, winning games, etc.).97 Of course, no
protection could exist for playbooks containing general types of plays9" or plays

12 1d §

1(4).
See id (listing the general categories of potentially protectable trade secrets).
9 See MILGRIM, smpranote 27, § 1.09 (providing a survey of categories of information that courts
have deemed worthy of inherent protection: food, drug, and cosmetics formulae and processes,
industrial formulae, metal processes, methods and techniques embodying "know-how," product
machines, marketing products, computer software, plans and patterns for development, customer
lists, merchandising information, cost and pricing material, books and records, systems for materials
creation, and real estate/geophysical information).
9 The author is unaware of any suit currently being brought by a sports organization or heard
by a court on the issue of sports playbook protection.
96 It should be noted that a copyright on a football play formation was successfully registered
with the U.S. Copyright Office in 1985. Reg. TXu-215-357. A Texas coach registered what he called
the "I-Bone Formation," which is a cross between the power I and wishbone formations. See Craig
Neff, Whose Bone Is It, Atyway?, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Jan. 23, 1989, at 7.
9 The value of the information is discussed more fully in Part B of this section.
9 This reference is in regard to general run, pass, or blitz plays that are not scripted for any
particular opponent or designed to be run at any particular time to achieve a specified objective. For
the policy reasons discussed in Part VI, general plays contained in a playbook that are essential to
the competitive nature of the sport itself should not receive protection.
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based only on a general knowledge of their use.99 A series of plays designed for
execution at a particular time for a pre-determined outcome, however, would
seem to qualify as protectable subject matter.
Trade secrets are typically thought to be methods, processes, and formulae for
tangible products. That inclination seems quite natural considering that courts
have held numerous product design techniques and preparation methods for
manufacturing to be protected under the UTSA. For example, methods of
preparing components for product design" as well as operating, training, and
process manuals for manufacturing products"0 have all garnered trade secret
protection."0 2
Trade secrets need not exist solely for the protection of production or
manufacturing techniques though. Secret methods and techniques are used in a
For example, a method of utilizing
wide variety of different businesses.'
information forms to facilitate communication between medical patients and state
agencies was protected in Texas."° The Supreme Court of Georgia has even held
that a specific technique for barbecuing meats is a trade secret.' Trade secrets
also have been upheld for methods of running group sessions for the purpose of
discouraging smoking;" training techniques for teaching individuals how to speed
methods
read;'07 instructional techniques for personal spiritual advance;'
designed to help individuals achieve proficiency at zip-coding mail; °9 and
instructional materials for preparing professional school graduates for state

CompareSI Handling Sys., Inc. v. Heisley, 753 F.2d 1244,1261, 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 441,452
(3d Cir. 1985) (recognizing that no trade secret protectior exists for matters that consist of general
knowledge and skill in the field), with Universal Analytics, Inc. v. The MacNeal-Schwendler Corp.,
707 F. Supp. 1170,1177 (C.D. Cal. 1989) (reaffirming that trade secret information must be designed
with sufficient specificity such that the claimant could "separate it from matters of general
knowledge in the trade or of special knowledge of those persons ... skilled in the trade" (citing
Diodes, Inc. v. Franzen, 67 Cal. Rptr. 19, 24 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968))).
,' Monovis, Inc. v. Aquino, 905 F. Supp. 1205 (W.D.N.Y. 1994).
101Minn. Mining& Mfg. Co. v. Pribyl, 259 F.3d 587,59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 (7th Cir. 2001).
102 T-N-T Motorsports, Inc. v. Hennessey Motorsports, Inc., 965 S.W.2d 18, 22-23 (Tex. App.
1998).

103 See MILGRIM, smpra note 27, § 1.09 (discussing examples of trade secret protection within
eighteen different categories of business information).
" Gonzales v. Zamora, 791 S.W.2d 258 (Tex. App. 1990).
1'5 Baxley v. Black, 162 S.E.2d 389 (Ga. 1968).
0 Smokenders, Inc. v. Smoke No More, Inc., 280 So. 2d 72 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973), arf'g 179
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 111 (N.Y. Sup. 1973).
107 Johnston v. Am. Speedreading Acad., Inc., 526 S.W.2d 163, 166 (Tex. App. 1975).
10 Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Wollersheim, 1985 WL 72663, 228 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 534 (C.D. Cal.

1985), rev'don definitionalmerits,796 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir. 1986).
"9

Tabs Assocs., Inc. v. Brohawn, 475 A.2d 1203,1211-12 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1984).
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qualification examination."0 In one case, trade secret protection was recognized
for methods used in improving ballroom dancing moves."' Moreover, at least
one district court opinion seems to indicate that a process for strengthening
interpersonal communication skills might even be protectable in certain
instances."' Recognition of potential trade secret protection by these courts
suggests that objective criteria for measuring the success of an alleged trade secret
may not be necessary. Thus, determining the existence of an enforceable trade
secret is often a highly subjective determination."'
Additionally, measuring the economic value of subjectively judged trade
secrets is often appropriately undertaken only on apost hoc basis because many
times, only after the secret has been executed or utilized will the certainty of the
intended results be readily verifiable. Thus, formulae, processes, and designs for
products may produce a tangible object if used correctly (thereby making
evaluation of the success of the secret easy to measure), but the lack of an
objective measure of success should not be a deterrent to legal recognition of
trade secrets that create more subjective results. That result is neither intended
by the UTSA nor desired by the courts." 4 While nothing completely guarantees
that sports plays in a playbook will succeed as planned on any one occasion,
sports plays are arguably as certain to produce the desired result as these
aforementioned examples. Thus, scripted sports playbooks are a form of
information which surely qualifies as subject matter protectable under the trade
secret regime, particularly given the breadth of protection provided by most U.S.
jurisdictions and the expansive nature of the field as it developed from the
common law.

"' Stanley Educ. Methods, Inc. v. Becker C.P.A. Review Course, Inc., 536 F.2d 86 (5th Cir.
1976).
. Worrie v. Boze, 62 S.E.2d 876 (Va. 1951). Seeid at 881-82 (discussing contractual covenants
restricting competition). See MILGRIM, supra note 27, § 1.09131 at 1-392.1 (recognizing that the use
of reasonable restrictive covenants may provide a basis for trade secret protection of ballroom
dancing instruction).
12 McKay v. Communispond, Inc., 581 F. Supp. 801 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (finding no trade secret
on the facts presented). See MILGRIM, supra note 27, § 1.09[3] at 1-392.2 n.237 (recognizing that
particular factual circumstances militated against trade secret protection due to extensive publicity
concerning the methods and existence of numerous former employees teaching similar methods).
' See MILGRIM, sapra note 27, § 1.09 (providing examples of trade secret protection where no
objective measure for determining the success of the secret exists).
"4 See, e.g., Del Monte Fresh Produce Co. v. Dole Food Co., 136 F. Supp. 2d 1271, 1292 (S.D.
Fla. 2001) (recognizing that due to the fact-intensive nature of a trade secret, it would be
inappropriate to refuse recognition of a secret on a categorical assertion that the matter claimed
cannot be a trade secret).
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B. ECONOMIC VALUE TO THE BUSINESS

In order for business information to become a trade secret, it must have (1)
economic value which affords a competitive advantage, and (2) it must not be
exploitable by others in the field who could obtain and use the information by
These two sub-elements are naturally connected
proper means of discovery.'
to one another as the value of trade secret information generally arises because it
cannot be appropriated by proper means. Each of these elements will be
discussed in turn for clarity.
1. Trade Secret Information Must Derive Independent Economic Value to be Protected.
Under the Restatement of Torts section 757, comment b definition of-a trade
secret, the information must have been in actual use in the business.'16 Under a
strict application of this definition, only sports plays that are actually implemented
in a specific game are worthy of protection. This possibility need not be
addressed, however, because the UTSA has expressly abolished the actual use
requirement.' 7 Instead, the economic value of the secret information must only
be "actual or potential.""' The economic value of a sports play is in fact both
actual and potential.
A play can have actual value if it is independently successful when used and
directly produces a monetary gain for the organization."9 Any independent play
may succeed at the time it is executed and produce a beneficial result for the team.
A play may advance the ball down the field, produce a score, and win a game. If
a play independently produces a score, this may lead directly to team victories,

"' UNiF. TRADE SECRETS ACT 1 (2002); seeMILGRMI, supranote 27, § 1.02 at 1-137 (discussing
use of a trade secret, precommercial use, and cost of development).
n6 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939). See also Moore v. Ford Motor Co., 28 F.2d

529, 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1928), aft'd, 43 F.2d 685 (2d Cir. 1930) (arguing that the implicit tendency to
protect an idea which is in use is attributable to the pragmatic notion that what is of value is not the
idea alone, but the capacity to turn the idea to a productive use).
117 MILGRIM, supra note 27, § 1.02 at 1-137. See PERRrrT, supra note 5, at 87; Syntex Opthalmnics,
Inc. v. Tsuetaki, 701 F.2d 677, 683, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 962 (7th Cir. 1983) (concluding that the
proper test for determining protectable subject matter is value to the business, not actual use).
"' See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT §1 (4)(i) (2002). Therefore, the plays sought to be protected
might only need to be written in formal playbooks, awaiting implementation in the future. On the
other hand, the competitive advantage of the plays themselves can only be recognized when they are
used to achieve a result on the field at a particular moment. The value derives largely from a
retrospective surprise factor (to be discussed below). In any event, this Note focuses only on plays
within playbooks that are openly executed in games. See E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. United
States, 288 F.2d 904, 911, 129 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 473, 479 (Ct. Cl. 1961) (asserting that it is difficult
to determine whether an entirely unused idea will offer its discoverer a competitive advantage).
A single play could have actual value if that play wins a game on its own because it either
produces or prevents a winning score in circumstances that create an opportunity for direct financial
gain (e.g., a playoff, division, or Super Bowl victory).
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2°
which in turn leads to increased advertising, television, and radio exposure.
This exposure often translates into increased merchandise sales or lucrative media
contracts. 12 1 Thus, if routinely used at opportune times, a play may continuously
achieve these results and lead to a multitude of franchise wins and substantial
monetary gains. " As a team organization garners more victories, it reaps
increased financial rewards. A playoff berth or Super Bowl opportunity may
ultimately result from the consistent use of a well-scripted, creative playbook at
the right times. This translates into the highest financial gains possible within this
business field."
The creativity of the plays and the timing of their execution combine to
generate a su ~risefactorthat give the plays their potential value. 24 This actual or
potential economic value in sports plays does not differ from the manufacturing
or sales value inherent in successfully marketed products. Although the economic
value of a sports play is more difficult to calculate, a sports play can be just as
valuable to a sports team as a product design, formula, or process may be to a
manufacturing corporation or product developer. A sports team creates the
secret "by treating information in a certain manner, thereby demonstrating the
information's value and its proprietary nature.' 25
2. Economic Value Under the Law. Economic value gives rise to a competitive
business advantage. For example, the most famous trade secret of all, the formula
for the Coca-Cola beverage,' has immense value because it is used to create a
marketed product that cannot be duplicated by other competitors. "[I] t is beyond

120 See LONG,
121 Id

t

supra note 66, at 294.

See Das, rupra note 59, at 1099.
On the field, [teams] are similarly competing for economic value in two ways.
First, wins translate into exposure, be it on television or in the newspapers. This
is essentially advertisement that is valued at tremendous amounts. Second,
events like... the Super Bowl carry with them financial rewards directly linked
to wins and loses.

Id
2 See SuperBowlXXXIII: NmberCrmnching,ORLANDO SENTINEL,J an. 31,1999, availableat 1999
WL 2783863 (recognizing that each member of the winning team of the Super Bowl would have
received an additional $53,000, compared to the S32,500 given to losing team members).
" A sports play that is unknown or unanticipated by an opponent generally catches that team
off-guard. If the play surprises the opponent, it has a greater chance of being successful. The
potential value in a playbook is the potential success that it brings to a team when its plays are
executed. Whether this surprise factor proves successful is only recognizable in hindsight.
Nevertheless, the playbook's potential value existed all along.
125 See Corporate Compliance Series, Designing An Effective Intellectual Property Compliance
Program § 1.7 (2002) (referring to Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1002 (1984)).
126 See Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Shreveport v. The Coca-Cola Co., 107 F.R.D. 288,227 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 18 (D. Del. 1985).
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dispute that,. .. the Company possesses trade secrets which ... are extremely
valuable . .. [Coca-Cola]'s secret formulae are trade secrets and subject to the
maximum protection that the law... allows.' 17 Every Coca-Cola beverage sold
earns revenue for the company. The monetary gains arising from product sales
stem, in part, from the secrecy of the beverage's formula, just as a football team's
secret scripted playbook can lead to scoring, team wins, and franchise revenues
when used successfully against unsuspecting opponents.
Furthermore, the economic value of a business secret does not cease to exist
simply because "such information could be easily duplicated by others competent
in the given field. '' 121 Even if individual components of a trade secret were widely
known or could be combined easily to produce the information that has become
the secret, the unique compilation of information is what creates the economic
value for a business and gives the information its trade secret status.' 29 In the
same way, scripted football plays combine individual run, pass, block, and turn
routes with a timing factor in games against particular opponents. The result is
a combination of information that is secret, although the individual components
of the scripted play could not independently achieve trade secret status. 3 °
Courts have applied this same analysis to find trade secret value for many
different types of information: a chocolate powder produced from common
homemade ingredients,"' the process of combining chemicals for the varicella
virus vaccine, 32 training manuals explaining process standards for making resin
sheeting equipment, 133 a method of producing unique water color paintings,134 and

123 Id

at 294.

Mason v. Jack Daniel Distillery, 518 So. 2d 130,133 (Ala. Civ. App. 1987) (involving the trade
secrecy of an alcoholic drink known as the Lynchburg Lemonade that comprised about one third
of total sales for a local Alabama bartender).
'2 Seeid at 134.
[Mason's] ability to combine these elements into a successful [beverage], like the
creation of a recipe from common cooking ingredients, [may bel a trade secret
entitled to protection... The fact that every ingredient is known to the industry
is not controlling for the secret may consist of the method of combining them
which produces a product superior to that of competitors.
'

Id
130 These individual sports moves or routes are not likely to be protected because, as explained
earlier, they would comprise general sports play information with no degree of specificity, and could
not create value over competitors unless the fundamental aspects of playing the sport were to be
comprised.
'' Lamont, Corliss & Co. v. Bonnie Blend Chocolate Corp., 238 N.Y.S. 78 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1929).
132 Merck & Co. v. SmithKline Beecham Pharm. Co., No. C.A. 15443-NC, 1999 WL 669354

(Del. Ch. 1999).
1
Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Pribyl, 259 F.3d 587,59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 (7th Cir. 2001).
1
College Watercolor Group, Inc. v. William H. Newbauer, Inc., 360 A.2d 200, 195 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 82 (Pa. 1976).
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even a method of pre-sorting zip-coded mail to achieve discounts.13 1 In light of
this judicial tendency to make liberal presumptions about the potential market
value of secret information, a strong case can be made for the recognition of
independent economic value in scripted plays.
C. FORMATION OF COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE

The economic value of a trade secret affords a competitive advantage in a
particular business market when other competitors are unable to access or
discover the information. This inability to access or discover certain business
information arises for two reasons: (1) the specific information is not generally
known in the field of business, and (2) the information cannot be readily
discovered by others in the field by proper means."' Thus, assuming that
reasonable steps are taken to maintain secrecy,' 37 a football team's scripted
playbooks are recognizable trade secrets because the information is privileged or
within the private knowledge of only those persons in the team organization who
assisted in the playbook's development. 3 Opponents can neither ascertain
undisclosed, secret plays in the market nor anticipate the substance or timing of
pre-designed plays without resorting to improper means that would constitute
misappropriation under the law. Importantly, those improper means of
acquisition or discovery would not eviscerate the trade secrecy of the information.
1. Trade Secrets Comprise Information 'Not Generally Known" to OtherPersons Who
Could Obtain Economic Value from its Disclosure or Use. One important element for
trade secrecy is that the information not be generally known to other knowledgeable persons in the same business field."' This competitive advantage element
seeks "to distinguish mundane changes to knowledge already in the public domain
from increments to knowledge that are valuable in some sense."" ° As discussed
above, information that is common knowledge cannot achieve trade secret
status.14 1 Readily ascertainable ideas or trivial advances in presently existing

Tabs Assocs., Inc. v. Brohawn, 475 A.2d 1203 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1984).
See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(1) (2002).
'7 See infra Part IV.D and accompanying text.
138 See PERRrrr, supra note 5, at 131-48 (explaining that business information which is not
"s

136

commonly known nor easily ascertainable by proper means by others in the relevant field, may
facilitate a competitive advantage in that specific market, giving rise to legal trade secret status).
"' See UNIF.TRADESECRETSACT § 1(4)(i) (2002) (using the language: "from not being generally

known to ...other persons who could obtain economic value from its disclosure or use...").
'40 PERRiTr, supra note 5, at 132 (recognizing that this idea of competitive advantage is similar
to the originality concept of copyright and the novelty and nonobvious requirements of patent law).
141 See MILGRIM, spra note 27, § 1.03 at 1-159.
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information are not likely to constitute trade secrets. 2 Although novelty and
investment are not considered independent requirements under the UTSA
definition, those factors can be highly probative.'
Furthermore, trade secrets
need not be absolutely unique even in a particular market in order to satisfy the
competitive advantage requirement."
Commonly used sports plays are typically known by others in the field. 4
Hence, these may not be protected under trade secret law. In contrast, specific
scripted plays that entail a unique combination of otherwise basic formations,
routes, or assignments are unknown to opponents and thus protectable. The
secret behind the plays contained in a team playbook consists of both the
substantive creativity and the timing of their execution. NFL coaches spend
extraordinary amounts of time watching films of their opponents' games to
perfect a strategy to use against a particular team for a particular upcoming
game.' 46 Coaches manipulate general run, pass, or blitz formations to produce
innovative assignments that will catch opponents by surprise.
Critics of a system of trade secret protection for scripted playbooks would
likely argue that teams can recognize trends of plays that are generally used by
their opponents by watching films of past games. Moreover, these critics would
likely argue that plays become generally known to the public because they are
overtly displayed in games at the time they are executed.'47 Thus, the argument
follows, scripted plays are not in fact secret because of well-established methods
8
of realizing the information that is likely to be contained in playbooks"

142

Id

PERRIrr,bupra note 5, at 131-44 (noting that jurisdictions following the Restatement ofTorts
section 757 continue to depend on at least a minimal showing of investment and novelty). For all
practical purposes, scripted playbooks do normally contain plays that are novel for the circumstances
in which they are used. These plays will not usually have been seen by opponents in the exact
formation or at the exact time in which they have been utilized in past games. In addition, it is quite
reasonable to believe that most scripted playbooks result from intense preparation and extensive
resources. Thus, in the context of scripted plays, investment and novelty factors are likely to be quite
probative of trade secret status.
'" See Religious Tech Ctr. v. Wollersheim, 796 F.2d 1076, 1090 (9th Cir. 1986) (noting that
several different competitors in the same market can have trade secret protection for the same
information, as long as the information gives each a competitive advantage over some others);
'

PERRITr, supra note 5, at 136-41.
"' For instance, a standard wide receiver post or flag pattern, or a simple running back toss or
dive is the type of play that most football players learn when they are in elementary school leagues,
or even younger.
146 See LONG, supra note 66.
' Interview with Mitch Stockwell, Adjunct Professor at the University of Georgia School of
Law and Attorney at Kilpatrick Stockton LLP, in Athens, Ga. (Nov. 13, 2002).
148 See PERRErrT, supranote 5, at 231 (recognizing the reverse engineering possibility as a counter
to trade secret status).
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This public disclosure is legally inconsequential, however, because the timing
and substance of these plays is not known to others in the business who could
take advantage of the information. Opponents may anticipate types of plays that
may be executed in a game, but they cannot be certain as to when the plays will
be executed.149 This element of surprise creates the competitive advantage that
makes a set of scripted plays valuable. The general public's knowledge of all
elements of an idea does not negate trade secret status since the real secret might
reside in a special combination of otherwise well-known principles."' While a
scripted play may contain general football movements, the creativity, originality,
and timing decisions, taken together, may provide a distinct advantage over a
competitor.1 ' Although a play is publicly performed in a game, recorded on film,
and reviewed later by other coaches in the league, no general indication as to
when a similar play will be utilized again may be ascertained. Therefore, a scripted
playbook contains secrets that cannot be generally known in advance unless
misappropriated prior to their use by improper means.'5 2 The Eleventh Circuit
appears to support this same concept-that publicly available knowledge in the
absence of specific, significant information as to the manner in which that
information will be used is implicitly secret. 3 "Even if all of the information is

"I' See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39(o ("The fact that some or all of
the components of [a]trade secret are well-known does not preclude protection for a secret
combination, compilation, or integration of the individual elements.").
tso
See MILGRIM, spra note 27, § 1.03 at 1-161.
's' For a trade secret to derive value from "not being generally known," only the precise
compilation of information must be "not generally known." Knowledge of common attributes of
a particular form of trade secret information does not prevent the information from existing as a
business secret. See Water Servs., Inc. v. Tesco Chems., Inc., 410 F.2d 163,173,162 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
321, 329 (5th Cir. 1969) ("[A] trade secret can exist in a combination of characteristics and
components, each of which, by itself, is in the public domain, but the unified process, design and
operation of which in unique combination, affords a competitive advantage and is a protectable
secret."); Salsbury Labs., Inc. v. Merieux Labs., Inc., 735 F. Supp. 1555, 1569 (M.D. Ga. 1989), affid,
908 F.2d 706,15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1489 (11th Cir. 1990) ("A unique process which is not known
in the industry 'can be a trade secret even if all of its component steps are commonly known.' "
(citing Rohm and Haas Co. v. AZS Corp., No. C.A. 1:85-CV-4337-RCF, 1988 WL 192886, at *9
(N.D. Ga. Mar. 18,1988)));see Basic Am., Inc. v. Shatila, 992 P.2d 175,185 (Idaho 1999) (noting that
a finding that a specific process is unique to an industry is evidence that the process is not "generally
known" or "readily ascertainable").
"52See infra Part IV.C.2 and accompanying text.
153 See Capital Asset Research Corp. v. Finnegan, 160 F.3d 683, 686,48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1853
(11 th Cir. 1998) (indicating that the special combination of otherwise unprotectable information may
qualify for trade secret protection if the newly-formed compilation of common elements has not
been previously discovered in the field) (relying on Essex Group, Inc. v. Southwire Co., 501 S.E.2d
501 (Ga. 1998)).
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publicly available, a unique compilation of that information, which adds value,
also may qualify as a trade secret."'5 4
2. Trade Secret Information Must Not Be 'Ready'Ascertainable" bv ProperMeans.
Even if secret information is not generally known within the business field, if it
could still be "ascertainable" by others,' this could prevent the information from
existing as a trade secret under the law. In other words, this is simply another way
of asking whether the information that is sought to be protected is truly secret.'
Scripted playbooks meet this "not readily ascertainable" requirement. While some
may argue that competitors could obtain the information from playbooks by
making personal use of existing game film materials, this argument fails for two
reasons. First, it fails to recognize the significance of the "timing factor" of playcalling as the primary source of competitive advantage. Second, to the extent
playbook information is readily ascertainable at all,' any possible manner of

154

155

Finnegan, 160 F.3d at 686, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1855.
See generaly UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(i) (stating that a trade secret "derives

independent economic value, from ...not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other
persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use..."). The statute thus defines
the relative group of persons who would be deemed to have improperly ascertained business
information as those persons "who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use." In the
context of professional sports, this would presumably include any person who is affiliated with
(employed by) a team organization or competitor thereof; any outside third party who would be
willing to sell, bribe, transfer, or otherwise disclose playbook information; or anyone who has the
potential to disclose mistakenly the contents of a particular team's playbook to its competitors. This
author assumes that business competitors, or employees thereof, might desire or even accept such
secret information if made available to them, although this would certainly not be the case in all
instances.
156See MILGRIM, supranote 27, § 1.03.
"' The drafters of the UTSA have defined information as "readily ascertainable" if it "is available
in trade journals, reference books, or published materials." UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 cmt.
In one Georgia case, the court found trade secret protection for a telecommunications provider's
logistics system, even though almost all of the computer hardware components in the system were
commercially available. The Georgia Supreme Court explained the concept "readily ascertainable"
in the following way:
trade secrets may be acquired by others either through independent development
or by reverse engineering, and the acquisition of trade secret information by
these means is not improper in the absence of any misappropriation. [O.C.G.A.
§ 10-1-761(1)]. Thus, the [Georgia Trade Secrets] Act explicitly recognizes that
trade secret information is protectable until it has been acquired by others by
proper means.... "The theoretical ability of others to ascertain the information
through proper means does not necessarily preclude protection as a trade secret.
Trade secret protection remains available unless the information is readily
ascertainable by such means. Thus, if acquisition of the information through an
examination of a competitor's product would be difficult, costly, or
time-consuming, the trade secret owner retains protection against an improper
acquisition, disclosure, or use."
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discovering the valuable information (assuming reasonable secrecy), would be
improper and otherwise constitute misappropriation.
a. Independent Discoveg Methods of Anayng Game Films Cannot Lead to
SuccessfulAcquisition of the Secret Information in Playbooks. The comment to section
one of the UTSA defines "proper means" of discovery to include discovery by
independent invention, reverse engineering, licensing, and observation of the
5 9
8
trade secret via public use or display and by publication."' As discussed above,1
observation of readily available films of past games for a particular team does not
provide adequate public disclosure of the secret play information contained in
scripted playbooks. Although helpful to a coach in preparing for an opponent,
the films do not reveal the substance or timing of future plays. Moreover, the
trade secrets are not readily ascertainable by any means of reverse engineering or
independent invention." A good sense of anticipation and guesswork cannot be
considered independent knowledge of the playbook." Thus, due to the inherent

Essex Group, Inc. v. Southwire Co., 501 S.E.2d 501, 504 (Ga. 1998). See also East v. Aqua Gaming,
Inc., 805 So. 2d 932 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (finding that a corporation's customer list was a trade
secret, and thus not readily ascertainable by proper means; where Aqua Gaming showed that its
customer list was the product of great expense and effort, that it included information that was
confidential and not available from public sources, and that it was distilled from larger lists of
potential customers into a list of viable customers for its unique business).
s5 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1, commissioners' cmt.
5See supra Part IV.c. I and accompanying text.
,6 It should be noted, however, that if two coaches devised the exact same play in the same
situation without any knowledge of the other's playbook, both secrets would exist for each creator
simultaneously (at least in theory). Since this author is discussing trade secret status for specific
scripted plays on eleven player movements in combination with a specific time of execution, the
odds of such a coincidence are very slight.
161 "Trade secrets cease to be trade secrets when competitors duplicate them by 'legitimate,
independent research.' " Sabugy Labs., Inc., 735 F. Supp. at 1569 (quoting Thomas v. Best Mfg.
Com., 218 S.E.2d 68,71 (Ga. 1975)). However, independent research such as reverse engineering
is not the same as a team trying to anticipate upcoming plays. "Reverse engineering occurs when
an entity starts with a known product and, working backwards, divines the process which aided in
its manufacture." Westech Gear Corp. v. Dep't of Navy, 733 F. Supp. 390, 392 (D.D.C. 1989)
(citing Knewanee Oil Co. v. Bicrou Corp., 416 U.S. 470,476,181 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 673,676 (1974)).
Educated guesswork does not enable a team coach to "divine" or "know" the secrets contained
within a playbook, as exists when a product or computer software is reverse-engineered. Thus, the
fact that a coach could theoretically make a correct guess as to a team's future plays, does not mean
the playbook information is not a trade secret. See Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226,
1243, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1913, 1926 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (quoting By-Buk Co. v. Printed Cellophane
Tape Co., 329 P.2d 147,152,118 U.S.P.Q. 550, 553 (Cal. App. 1958)) (stating that information can
be a trade secret even if it "is something that could be discovered by others by their own labor and
ingenuity"); Telex Corp. v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 510 F.2d 894,929,184 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 521,526
(10th Cir. 1975) (quoting 367 F. Supp. 258, 358 (D. Okla. 1973)) (holding that information
constituted a trade secret even though it could have been procured by a competitor, "given enough
time and expense, by independent investigation, research or experience").
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nature of the information contained in secret scripted plays, other competitors
cannot obtain the special information in this manner. This stands in contrast to
computer programmers who in order to discern written code can use reverse
engineering. 6 2 Watching film and researching other teams' tendencies can only
be characterized as "professional speculation" or "educated guesswork."
b. Misappropriationof a Playbook Leading to Discovery by Competitors Would
Constitute IllegalMeans of DisclosureThat Would Not EviscerateTrade Secret Status. The
63
secrecy of playbook information could be compromised in one of three ways:
(1) wrongful disclosure of play information by personnel within a team organization, (2) theft of playbooks and subsequent sale or bribery by third parties, or (3)
visual or electronic theft measures by direct competitors which are used to
intercept and relay specific play-calling between coaches, coordinators, and players
during games. Even if these methods of ascertaining plays were successful,
however, the competitor's actions would constitute improper means of discovery
and would not negate the trade secret status of playbook information that could
be used in future games. Thus, if a team organization could demonstrate specific
damages arising from playbook theft or disclosure, the team would have grounds
for a misappropriation cause of action pursuant to the UTSA.' 6
i. Disclosure by Personnel Within a Team Organi Zation. Sports playbooks
are developed by the team's coach in collaboration with a handful of assistant
coordinators. Obviously, the players are also privy to the secret plays because
they are exposed to then in practice sessions and execute them during games.
Players and coaches are employees of a team organization, and these employment
relationships exist through formal sports contracts. 6 s Employees of the
franchises generally agree to formal confidentiality or non-disclosure provisions'"
in their contracts with the team organization. These provisions ensure that
employees will not disclose any secret proprietary information obtained in the
course of their employment. 6 This relationship of confidence places a duty on

1"2

This type of anticipation does not detract from a secret playbook that deserves legal

protection.
163

See MERRICK T. ROSSEIN, EMPLOYMENT LAW DESKBOOK FOR HUMAN RESOURCES

PROFESSIONALS § 3:15 (2003) (discussing various methods of wrongful acquisition or disclosure).
164 See, e.g., Four Seasons Hotels & Resorts BY. v. Consorcio Barr, S.A., 267 F. Supp. 2d 1268
(S.D. Fla. 2003) (holding that hotel licensee was liable under Florida law for misappropriation of
trade secrets under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act by acquiring the licensor's detailed customer
profiles through improper means, namely, by theft and by espionage through electronic means).
165 See lmg Football, at http://www.imgfootball.com/marketing/default.asp (discussing sports
contracts) (last visited Oct. 26, 2003).
16 Seegeneral4 Corporate Compliance Series, supra note 125, § 3:5 (explaining that these clauses
are agreements not to communicate or disclose to others any trade secrets or confidential
information of the employer).
16' SeeJOHN GLADSTONEMILLS, III ETAL., PATENTLAw FUNDAMENTALS § 12:34 (2d ed. 2003
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the employee to refrain from making improper use of secret playbooks."6 ' When
a trade secret is compromised by illegaldisclosure from breach of an express or
implied duty, courts are likely to find that misappropriation has occurred.'69
Furthermore, any intentional, accidental, or mistaken disclosure of play
information by these team personnel, either directly to competitors or indirectly
to persons who may supply it to competitors, would constitute misappropriation. 7° It is irrelevant under the law whether these employees actually sell,
provide, or distribute tangible playbooks containing the secret play information.
If team employees obtain, access, or simply commit to memory the information
contained in these books to use in upcoming games and assist others in exploiting
its value, by selling it to competitors
or third parties, for instance, they are illegally
71
misappropriating trade secrets.

rev.) (noting that in some jurisdictions, it is well settled that one of the implied terms of employment
is that an employee will hold sacred any trade secrets that the employee acquires in the course of his
employment, therefore a formal contract is unnecessary to prove a relationship of confidence);
MILGRIM, supra note 27, § 3.02 at 3-9, 10 (noting that misappropriation will be found in many
circumstances even in the absence of a formal agreement not to disclose specific proprietary
information).
16' Seegeneral# RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION %40-42. "The employment
relationship by its nature ordinarily justifies an inference that the employee consents to a duty of
confidence with respect to any information acquired through the employment that the employee
knows or has reason to know is confidential." Id § 42 cmt. c. See also § 41 cmt. c (noting that the
employment relationship will ordinarily justify the recognition of a duty of confidence when the
employer puts the employee on notice that the information is confidential).
169 See PERRrrT, supra note 5, at 149-88 (explaining that breach of contract in a manner that
compromises trade secret information gives rise to a finding of illegal misappropriation).
170 See MILGRIM, stpranote 27, § 3.01 at 3-3 (noting that courts recognize the UTSA concept of
misappropriation as embodying either or both of two common law principles in cases of illegal
disclosure: "(1) the disclosure is in breach of an implied contract which ... is projected upon the
relationship between the parties, or, (2) the wrongful disclosure and use is in breach of the duties
arising from a confidential relationship"); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(2) (accidental or mistaken
disclosure may also lead to misappropriation). Case law supporting this proposition is extensive.
171 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION

§ 42 cmt. d

(noting that although the

distinction between information retained in memory and information embodied in appropriated
records can be relevant in determining whether the information qualifies for protection, the
employee's reliance on memory is not a defense if the information is in fact a trade secret); see aLro
MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511,26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1458 (9th Cir. 1993);
Sperry Rand Corp. v. Rothlein, 241 F. Supp. 549, 563, 143 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 172, 184 (D. Conn.
1964) (stating that it is irrelevant whether the trade secret "came out in a defendant's hand or in his
head"). Note that the information in secret playbooks is arguably developed by a coach alone and
thus may not exist as property of the team organization. When an employee leaves his place of
employment, he" 'has a right to take with him all the skill he has acquired, all the knowledge he has
obtained, and all the information that he has received, so long as nothing is taken that is the property
of the employer.' " Textile Rubber & Chem. Co. v. Shook, 255 S.E.2d 705, 708, 208 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 352, 355 (Ga. 1979) (citing Vendo Co. v. Long, 102 S.E.2d 173,175 (Ga. 1958)). Regardless
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ii. Acquisition of Tangibe Playbook Information by ThirdParty Theft. If not
the result of mistaken, accidental, or intentional disclosure by players or coaches,2
scripted playbooks nevertheless could be acquired and used by third parties1
through improper means. Disclosure due to improperacquisition, however, does
not cut against the argument for trade secrecy of playbooks, as that conduct
would give rise to a valid misappropriation claim.'73 The UTSA uses the term
"improper means" as a standard of business ethics.' 74 The use of that term "is
pivotal because the central policy behind trade secrecy is to deter 'breach of faith
and reprehensible means of learning another's trade secret.'" 75 The UTSA states
that " 'improper means' includes theft, bribery, misrepresentation, breach, or
inducement of a breach of duty to maintain secrecy, or espionage through
electronic or other means.' 76 It further includes conduct that is situationally
improper as well as the unauthorized disclosures of lawfully acquired secrets.'
This "language represents a broadening of the common law concept of breach of
confidence,"' 7' and the catalogue of acts that constitute "improper means" is not9
meant to comprise a complete roster of the possibilities of unethical behavior.1
As discussed earlier, pre-designed plays for an upcoming game are developed
in practice and then formally drawn up in tangible playbooks. Generally, only the
team's coach, coordinators, and players have access to a playbook itself"'s
Misappropriation could occur, however, if these playbooks were stolen and sold
directly to competitors or were illegally disclosed through sale by third parties who

of who actually maintains ownership of the physical playbooks, this author assumes that coaches
would have very little incentive to disclose voluntarily their own secret playbooks to competitors at
any time while they were employed by a specific team. Hence, the issue of ownership of playbooks
under circumstances where a coach ends employment for one team and begins as another team's
coach will not be discussed in this Note.
' By third parties, this author is referring to persons either inside or outside of the team
organization who are not involved in the development of the playbooks, or otherwise do not have
legal access to the information. The author assumes that this group of persons includes all
individuals other than the coaches, coordinators, and players involved in play development.
"" See, e.g., Bd. of Regents of State of Fla. v. Taborsky, 648 So. 2d 748, 754 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1994) (holding that a university was entitled to an injunction preventing a former student from using,
disclosing, or selling stolen laboratory notebooks which contained proprietary and confidential
research).

Samuels & Johnson, supra note 2, at 54, 55.
Id at 55 (quoting UTSA commissioners' prefatory note). The Supreme Court in Kewanee Oil
Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974) recognized that "the maintenance of standards of
commercial ethics" is a leading policy underlying trade secret law.
176 UNIF. IRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(1) (2002).
177 Id § 1 commissioners' comment.
175 Samuels &Johnson, supra note 2, at 55.
"i UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § I commissioners' cmt. (2002).
o Interreption, Aupra note 8.
174
175
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have no knowledge of how they were obtained but should have realized that their
availability was the result of illegal methods of discovery.' 8' "In the NFL,
playbooks are treated like trade secrets. Players can be fined thousands of dollars
for losing or misplacing them .
,,.s."'sDue to the immense value of these
playbooks, large incentives exist for immoral crusaders to ascertain information
pertaining to scripted plays and to distribute that information to those who are
willing to pay large sums of money.
The occurrence of illegal acquisition and criminal activity with respect to
football playbooks is not as far-fetched as it may seem. For example, in the past
year, extremely valuable playbooks were stolen from the University of Miami
Hurricanes," 3 which at the time was the most likely contender for the $12 million
BCS Fiesta Bowl in 2003, and from the Philadelphia Eagles franchise," s which at
the time was a strong preseason favorite for the 2003 Super Bowl. Certainly, one
could suspect that many instances of illegal acquisition and use occur that
organizations never discover."8 s
Acquisition of playbooks by those lacking a team organization's consent is
theft, whether it is procured directly by competitors or whether the information
is obtained indirectly but with knowledge of improper means of discovery. Theft
creates a legal cause of action for misappropriation."' "Strangers may be liable

"' See U.S. Anchor Mfg., Inc. v. Rule Indus., Inc., 717 F. Supp. 1565,1576 (N.D. Ga. 1989) ("A
cause of action for misappropriation of confidential business information exists when [o]ne who, for
purposes of advancing a rival business interest, procures by improper means information about
another's business .... ) (quoting RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757).
182Intereption,smpra note 8.
183 The Miami Hurricanes were the National Champions of college football in 2002 and were the
frontrunners for the Championship again in 2003. In March 2002, two playbooks, one offensive and
one defensive, were stolen and posted on the internet. The playbooks were taken from the office
of linebacker coach Vernon Hargreaves and the playbook pages were removed from the binders.
Team officials checked the Internet and found playbook pages scanned on the website titled
"Sandman's 4-3 Defense On-Line." Id
"' Last fall, three central Texas coaches agreed to pay $3000 each to former Dallas Cowboys
offensive coordinator Ernie Zampese, former Philadelphia Eagles coach Buddy Ryan, and two of
Ryan's sons in order to settle a pending lawsuit. Zampese, Ryan, and his sons sued the coaches after
learning that their NFL playbooks had been posted for sale on the Internet. See id
18s See id NBA basketball player for the Indiana Pacers, Malik Sealy, left his playbook at Kennedy
International Airport in 1993. It was a scouting report on opponents' strengths and weaknesses.
The contents were read on a national radio show just hours before the teams began a first-round
playoff series. Sealy was heavily fined. In 1996, former Florida coach Steve Spurrier closed practice
to the media after some of his "ball plays" ended up on a website.
18 See, e.g., Camp Creek Hospitality Inns, Inc. v. Sheraton Franchise Corp., 139 F.3d 1396, 46
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1677 (11 th Cir. 1998) (finding misappropriation by illegal acquisition under the
Georgia Trade Secrets Act, where the evidence suggested that a hotel reservations company
improperly accessed confidential occupation and pricing data maintained by a commercial property
owner, by means of computer systems technology operated by the former, and disclosed that
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[for misappropriation] when they use or disclose a trade secret after using
improper means to acquire it, or with knowledge that it was misappropriated by
someone else... 7 Hence, theft of a team's physical playbooks is clearly improper
under the UTSA as a form of misappropriation and in no way renders secret play
information "readily ascertainable by proper means" under the statute.
iii. Electronic, Visual, or Other Espionage by Competitors at or Near the Time
of Use ofthe Trade Secret. The final way in which competitors could discover secret
playbook information is where an opponent's team personnel directly misappro5
priate a team's play-calling"'
during games through the use of electronic, visual,
or other espionage. Once again, these measures would clearly be considered
improper means of discovery under the UTSA, thereby giving rise to a misappropriation cause of action.
This sort of "on-the-scenes" espionage poses a much greater threat to
playbook owners. If opponents can know the exact timing of particular plays at
the precise moment they are implemented during a game, playbook owners
seemingly lose all competitive advantage.'89 Thus, trade secret law should
recognize a misappropriation cause of action for playbook theft and establish a
manageable framework for the deterrence of espionage and other illegal activity
1 90
in professional sports industries.
"While public policy favors competition, there are limits on how far one may
go in ascertaining the trade secrets of a rival.' 91 In particular, "[n]either the
92
Restatement nor the UTSA attempts to catalogue" the term "improper means."'
As a general rule though, "[i]mproper means need not be illegal or criminal, but

valuable information to a directly competing hotel franchise who was able to gain a competitive
advantage from its use).
"'
PERRITr, supra note 5, at 190 (explaining that strangers are "parties who have neither
contractual nor fiduciary duties to the owner of a trade secret"). See Four Seasons Hotels & Resorts
BV. v. Consorcio Barr, S.A., 267 F. Supp. 2d 1268 (S.D. Fla. 2003); Salsbury Labs., Inc. v. Merieux
Labs., Inc., 735 F. Supp. 1555, 1569 (M.D. Ga. 1989), aff'd, 908 F.2d 706 (11th Cir. 1990).
188In this context, espionage at the time of a play-call pertains to direct espionage of plays just
before they are implemented during a game. The only difference is that this type of espionage would
not involve theft of tangible playbooks. The information obtained would still indicate the substance
and execution of an upcoming play, yet direct espionage at or near the time a play is run would
provide additional certainty with respect to the exact timing of that individual play. As explained
further in this section, this sort of espionage would still constitute improper misappropriation of
playbook information, just without the benefit of the actual playbook.
'89Although employee sale or third party disclosure may reveal information about a team's game
plan as to the substance and timing of specific plays, "on-the-scenes" espionage provides an
additional element of certainty just before a play is executed. At that point, an opponent is already
anticipating a specific play-call, and it is simply a matter of shutting down that play.
90 See infra Parts V and VI and accompanying text.
191 PERRITr, supra note 5, at 190.
192 Id at 191.
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must 'fall below the generally accepted standards of commercial morality and
reasonable conduct.' "'" The UTSA includes the category "espionage, through
electronic or other means" as part of its definition of"improper means."'1 94 "The
commentary notes that otherwise lawful conduct can constitute improper means
because of the circumstances, citing airplane overflight used as aerial reconnais-

sance in E.L duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Christopher."' 5 Furthermore, "[t]he

Restatement [of Torts] commentary makes it clear that [measures of
though they cause no harm to interests
espionage] . .. may be improper even
196
other than the trade secret interest."'
During NFL games, each team has several assistant coordinators who are
stationed above the playing field in team booths.'97 The teams' coaches and
players are stationed on the sidelines of the field. 9 The coordinators have copies
of playbooks and watch the games develop from an aerial perspective. This
provides them with a better view of the plays utilized by an opponent on the field.
These coordinators relay play-calling strategy to the head coach on the sidelines
by means of electronic headsets. 99 The coach then decides which plays to run at
particular times based on the information from his coordinators. The coach
relays his play-calls to specific players on the field either by telling them in person
through sidelines conferences or by directly communicating through an electronic
speaker that certain players have implanted within their helmets.2 "°
This verbal exchange of information, whether in-person or through electronic
headsets, opens the door for espionage by opponents. Team opponents might
attempt to intercept play-calling through electronic eavesdropping or simply use
specialized visual devices such as binoculars to read the mouths of team personnel
who are communicating on the sidelines or in the team booths. If opponents can
decipher which play-calls are made by coaches and coordinators at or just before
the time they are executed in a game, opponents' coordinators in team boxes are

""Id (quoting RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. 0. See Clark v. Bunker, 453 F.2d 1006,
1011-12, 172 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 420 (9th Cir. 1972) (awarding punitive damages for extreme and
unlawful means employed to obtain a rival's trade secret, including commercial espionage).
See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS AcT § 1(1).
195PERRITT, supra note 5, at 191. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 commissioners' cmt. (citing
'"

El1. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cit. 1970)).
19 PERRIT, supra note 5, at 192. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. g (noting that a
competitor's liability depends not on the actor's purpose, but only on the means).
t97See LONG, supra note 66, at 298.
198 id
199 Id.
2o0The coach receives particular information from his coordinators about what strategies an

opponent is using for certain plays in the game and then refers to his playbook, which he maintains
in his possession on the sidelines, in order to determine what the appropriate play-call is at a
particular time.
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then able to unlock the secrets of the playbooks. These coordinators could
instantaneously relay this intercepted information to their own team personnel on
the sidelines and prevent any surprise from taking place. In other words, the
opponents would be able to "steal" a team's playbook right before the secret plays
are executed.2 ' The playbooks would seem to lose all value, and this disclosure
would destroy the secrecy of these "discovered" plays. Just last year, professional
baseball teams in the Major League made allegations of sign stealing. 20 2 It seems
only rational to presume that this same type of espionage is prevalent in the NFL
as well.
" 'Improper' means of acquiring another's trade secret... include theft, fraud,
[or] unauthorized interception of communications... ."" Interception of playcalling certainly qualifies as "improper means" of acquisition under the UTSA, the
Restatement of Torts, and the Restatement of Unfair Competition.
[W]hile using physical force to take a secret formula from someone's pocket[,] breaking into an office to steal the formula, and
fraudulent misrepresentation to induce disclosure are wrongful and
also are independently tortious, other means lawful when disassociated with trade secret may be improper when associated with trade
conversations and
secret acquisitions, such as recording telephone
24
other kinds of eavesdropping or espionage. 0
Thus, sports play espionage would be actionable misappropriation under any of
the aforementioned doctrines. For these reasons, the misuse of electronic or
visual devices does not render otherwise secret plays "readily ascertainable" by

201Teams which engaged in this type of electronic espionage could certainly be prosecuted under
the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. S 2511 (2000). This Act crirninalizes the
interception and disclosure of wire, oral, or electronic communications of any kind. Thus, to the
extent a team illegally intercepted electronic or visual communications between opposing coaches,
coordinators, or players during games, such actions would surely constitute "improper means" of
trade secret discovery, forming the basis of a civil UTSA misappropriation claim in addition to being
punishable under federal criminal law.
202 Michael Cunningham & Drew Olson, Sign Steafing Spat FansFlames ForCubs, Cards, at http://
www.jsonline.com/sports/brew/may02/42509.asp. A sign in professional baseball is a secret signal
between players or from coaches to players during the course of a game. It usually consists of a
seemingly arbitrary sequence of body motions that players interpret as the "play-call" at a particular
time in a game (i.e., bunt the ball, steal a base, take a pitch as a strike, etc.). If opponents can
decipher the meaning of certain signs, they may be able to gain a significant advantage to the extent
they are no longer surprised by a particular "play." See id
203 RESTATEMENT CIHIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 43 (1995).
204 PERRrIr, supra note 5, at 192. See Phillips v. Frey, 20 F.3d 623, 630 (5th Cir. 1994) (finding

inducement of disclosure by videotape an "improper method").
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proper means. °s Because any possible manner of discovering the secret
information contained in sports playbooks would violate contractual provisions
or constitute "improper means" of acquisition under accepted trade secret
standards, intellectual property law should afford a remedy to those parties who
have been victimized by misappropriation in professional sports.
D. REQUIREMENT OF REASONABLE EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN SECRECY

The UTSA requires reasonable efforts to maintain secrecy."0 6 Information is
not secret if it is a matter of common knowledge within the industry; "if it is
published in trade journals, reference books, or similar materials; or if it is readily
copyable from products on the market." 0 7 Football playbooks are inherently
8
secret, however, due to the nature of the information and the manner of its use
Having established that playbooks are in fact secret, the issue of what degree of
secrecy is required to maintain that trade secret remains. Arguably, NFL teams
currently take "reasonable" measures to protect the secrecy of playbooks.
Most courts opine that while absolute secrecy is not necessary, a substantial
element of secrecy is required such that it would be difficult for others to properly
acquire the information and/or that a modicum of originality separates it from
everyday knowledge.'
"Courts agree that trade secrets lie somewhere on a
continuum from what is generally known in a field to what has some degree of
uniqueness .... [S]ecrecy does not mean that the public must be incapable of
discovering it by fair means."'2t Indeed, "[o]nly as much secrecy is required as is
practicable under the circumstances." 21' The Restatement of Torts has also
expressly adopted this notion of relative or qualified secrecy.212 In the case of a
unique secret, the secrecy of the underlying process or formula would not be
challenged by the fact that others are carrying on research in an effort to ascertain
the secret.213 Many courts explicitly state that the "degree of secrecy" element is

' See, e.g., RKI, Inc. v. Grimes, 177 F. Supp. 2d 859,875 (N.D. IUl.2001) (finding misappropriation of customer/financial information by improper means where an employer's confidential
computer files were downloaded by a former employee from the business's computer database).
216 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(ii) (2002). See ROSSEIN, spra note 163, § 3:15 ("mhe
company claiming the trade secret must treat the information in question as a secret and must take
reasonable steps to keep it secret.")
"7 PERRITr, smpra note 5, at 105.

o See supra Part IV.C.2.a and accompanying text.
2 MILLS, supra note 167, § 4:7 (describing novelty and secrecy requirements of intellectual
property laws).
210 Id
21

PERRITr, spranote 5, at 108.

OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939).
supra note 27, § 1.07121, at 1-345 (noting that the cases which even imply the

212 RESTATEMENT
213 MILGR1M,
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satisfied by the existence of confidential relationships based on the notion of
good faith security measures. 14 Others view secrecy as merely a private matter:
"something known only to one or a few and kept from others. 215
In the NFL, football teams do not maintain absolute secrecy because coaches,
coordinators, and players all access the team playbooks in preparation for
upcoming games. In other words, the secret plays are not hidden in an unknown
vault, which may be opened only by a few elite persons. 16 Teams do undertake
practical and reasonable measures to maintain relative secrecy though. Specifically, teams require players and coaches to sign confidentiality agreements when
they become employees of an organization. These agreements create express
fiduciary duties to refrain from disclosing any secret material developed during
their employment with the team. 17 Even in the absence of a contract, implied
218
fiduciary duties arise due to the confidential nature of these interrelationships.
"Confidentiality agreements with employees help satisfy the secrecy requirement,
but they are not strictly necessary because of employee duties implicit in the
employment relationship ....
In addition to imposing contractual obligations on people to whom trade
secrets are disclosed, trade secret owners who want to satisfy the secrecy
requirement might also restrict physical access to the trade secret.2 ° NFL teams
only allow those persons who are intricately involved in developing, executing, or
formally writing plays in playbooks to access copies of a particular playbook.22'
The head coach is generally the only person in an organization who has access to

necessity of absolute secrecy are in a distinct minority, and the prevailing school of thought suggests
that secrecy need only be relative).
24 See Vulcan Detinning Co. v. American Can Co., 67 A. 339, 343 (1907) (explaining that the
secrecy requirement expresses a concept of "qualified secrecy that arises from mutual understanding,
and that is required alike by good faith and by good morals").
5 See Kaumagraph Co. v. Stampagraph Co., 138 N.E. 485,487 (N.Y. 1923) (affirming the idea
that relative secrecy is sufficient).
216 Consider the Coca-Cola formula as a good example of absolute secrecy. The Coca-Cola
Company maintains a written version of the secret formula for "Merchandise 7X" in a security vault
at the Trust Company Bank in Atlanta, Georgia, and that vault can only be opened by resolution
from the company's Board of Directors. It is the company's policy that only two persons in the
company shall know the formula at any one time and that only those persons may oversee the actual
preparation of "Merchandise 7X." The company refuses to allow the identity of those persons to
be disclosed or to allow those two persons to fly on the same airplane at the same time. Similar
precautions surround the experimental formulae of the Company. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of
Shreveport v. The Coca-Cola Co., 107 F.R.D. 288,290,227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 18,22 (D. Del. 1985).
217 See MILLS, sapra note 167, S 12:34.
218 id

219PERRMIr, supra note 5, at 120-21.
220 Id at 120.
"' See Interception, supra note 8.
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all of the playbooks for a particular game."m Players only have access to
playbooks containing the plays they will be executing, and coordinators maintain
separate playbooks depending on whether they supervise offense, defense, special
teams, quarterbacks, linebackers, and so forth. 223 Every facet of game preparation
is compartmentalized. These persons are instructed to keep the playbooks locked
in their personal home or office space or within their possession at all times.224
This level of tight, restricted access is most likely sufficient to satisfy the secrecy
requirement even though players and coaches carry around their copies of
225
playbooks in public.
Other possible security measures include limited copying, restricted access,
proprietary notices, and strict security policies for possession of tangible, secret
information. Most NFL coaches have even begun covering their mouths in
games when making play-calls. 6 This method of maintaining the secrecy of playcalls is certainly reasonable because it prevents opponents and strangers from
discerning what the coach is saying to players or coordinators just before plays are
executed. Therefore, since teams actively police their already-stringent policies to
ensure that playbooks never leave the coach's possession in public and take
reasonable precautions to ensure that opponents or the media do not ascertain
play information prior to implementation, these measures, when taken together,
most likely establish reasonable means of maintaining qualified secrecy of
professional playbooks.227
E. PLAYBOOKS DESERVE TRADE SECRET PROTECTION

Sports playbooks contain information that is secret, valuable, and affords a
competitive advantage within professional sports industries. This information

222 See

THEISMAN, .rupra note 64, at 54.

2ZId

, See Interception, spra note 8.
See id See, e.g., In re Innovative Constr. Sys., Inc., 793 F.2d 875, 230 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 94 (7th
Cir. 1986) (findingthat security measures to guard formulae were sufficient even though one formula
was posted on a wall, because other formulae were kept in a notebook in the manager's office);
Electro-Miniatures Corp. v. Wendon Co., 771 F.2d 23 (2d Cir. 1985) (restricting access to drawings
and placing proprietary labels on them was sufficient security); Allen v. Jahar, Inc., 823 S.W.2d 824,
21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1854 (Ark. 1992) (holding that a customer list was adequately guarded by
restricting access to the list and destroying old customer printouts); Surgidev Corp. v. Eye Tech.,
Inc., 648 F. Supp. 661 (D. Minn. 1986) (finding security for sales information adequate because
material was distributed to employees on a "need-to-know" basis).
Commentary ofJohn Madden & Al Michals, Monda Night Footbal"Pittsbuh Steelers v. Tampa
Bay Buccaneers (ABC sports television broadcast, Dec. 23, 2002).
" See MILGRIM, supranote 27, § 1.07[2] (noting that any factors bearing upon use by third parties
constitute questions of fact).
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includes detailed instructions pertaining to the substance and execution of
particular sports plays against particular opponents for specific upcoming games.
The unique nature of sports playbooks and the manner in which they are used for
value by teams operating as professional businesses makes this information
inherently secret and novel.
Playbooks are neither a matter of general knowledge within sports industries
nor readily ascertainable, except by improper means of disclosure, acquisition, or
direct espionage and theft, all of which would certainly constitute misappropriation under existing trade secret standards (as defined by the UTSA and reinforced
by the Restatements of Torts and Unfair Competition). Moreover, sports teams
recognize the immense value ofplaybook information and take practical measures
to ensure that these playbooks remain secret from competitors. Thus, playbooks
are a subject matter worthy of trade secret protection under the law.
V. PROPOSAL FOR A PRACTICAL SYSTEM OF ENFORCING TRADE SECRET
PROTECTION IN PROFESSIONAL SPORTS

As this Note has explained, there is a strong basis for protecting sports
playbooks under existing trade secret standards, but recognition of those legal
rights is of little consequence in the absence of satisfactory enforcement or
remedies. A manageable system of legal protection can exist in professional
sports through the use of a central legal agency which could make evaluations of
submitted complaints under an arbitration committee system similar to that
currently utilized in many U.S. industries. If sports playbooks comprise
information protectable under trade secret law, then a system for enforcing
violations of those laws by providing substantial remedies to victimized parties
would deter misappropriation and other improper conduct within the industry.
A workable system of enforcement would thus provide a real, recognizable
remedy for deterring improper acquisition, disclosure, and espionage in the NFL.
Several commentators have recommended the establishment of on-site lawyers8
and arbitrators at sporting events to evaluate instantaneously legal disputes.2
They contend that this on-site mediation/arbitration would effectively protect
intellectual property disputes and preserve fairness and efficiency throughout
sporting events. 229 While satisfactory in theory, on-site legal arbitration would
seem to pose administrative concerns that may detract from the integrity of

2' E.g., Das, supra note 59, at 1099; Lisa A. Delpy & Kathleen B. Costello, Lauyering on the Front
Lines: On-Site Legal CounselforMajorSporing Events, 6 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 29, 30 (1995) (suggesting
that the use of on-site legal counsel could "be a key factor in preserving the event's financial viability,
public accountability, and ultimate success").
'
See Das, spranote 59, at 1100.
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professional sporting events as great time, effort, and expense would likely be
necessary to effectively assess legal disputes. The modem sports game would
become an all-day extravaganza filled with repeated stoppages, complaints, and
evaluation by numerous legal personnel. That delay would certainly compromise
the appeal of professional sports as a source of public entertainment. Therefore,
a system of legal arbitration removed from the field itself would likely provide the
most practical system of enforcement of trade secret rights involving playbooks.
Sports contests could continue unimpeded with legal disputes, and closed panel
resolution of trade secret complaints could more effectively preserve the secrecy
of playbook information, thereby preventing untimely disclosure to competitors
during an on-site game review.
The establishment of a central legal agency to preside over each individual
sports industry (NFL, MLB, NHL, NBA, etc.) is the first component of the
proposal offered in this Note. The agency would serve as an independent body
that would receive, evaluate, and dispense with certain legal claims alleging
misappropriation. Teams with a substantial reason to suspect misconduct on the
part of competitors or third parties affiliated with competitors could submit a
trade secret complaint to a specialized panel of the agency. The complaint would
consist of written allegations documented with affidavit-style or video-recorded
evidence supporting the truth of the allegations. The accused team would be
given an opportunity to respond in the same manner. After those submissions,
the agency, acting on its own legal knowledge, would make a decision based on
the information received.
To discourage frivolous claims, a high monetary filing fee for the team making
allegations to the agency should be required. Moreover, the standard of legal
evaluation by the agency should require a high level of prima facie evidentiary
proof. Such a system should also incorporate a one-time appeal for the losing
party to a separate board of committee members who would render the ultimate
decision on the matter. If this board was convinced by the sufficiency of the
evidence that playbook misappropriation or other improper conduct had taken
place, substantial monetary damages could be assessed against the guilty team
organization.
Furthermore, the arbitration agency system should be mandatory and binding
on all coaches, players, owners, and other team or franchise personnel and serve
2 30
as the exclusive remedy for particular playbook misappropriation issues.
Finally, the agency itself should consist only of lawyers who have specialized

30 See id (noting that arbitrators could be used to decide particular intellectual property disputes
for sports events); Richard C.Reuben, And the Winner Is... Arbitrators To Resolve Dirputes As They
Atiseat Ompics, 82 A.B.A.J. 20 (Apr. 1996) (discussing the use of arbitration committees at the 1996
Olympic Games inAtlanta to resolve disputes).
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knowledge in the fields of trade secret and espionage law and who work
exclusively for the agency.
The isolated nature of this proposed agency would also preserve the secrecy
of playbook information. The inability to pursue litigation, present witnesses, or
make oral arguments would further limit the time, expense, and complication of
resolving disputes. Independent review by a body which is removed from the
actual game setting would alleviate administrative concerns surrounding on-site
evaluation and decision. The sanctity of the sporting event itself would not be
jeopardized as significant legal resolution would take place behind the scenes.
As far as implementation is concerned, such an agency might provide an
exclusive remedy only in particular situations where litigation would be impractical. For instance, the panel could govern misappropriation disputes involving
espionage of play-calling during games. Obviously, altering the results of a
particular game after the fact would make little sense. Certain play-calls may have
been intercepted and successfully taken advantage of by an opponent, but filing
litigation in a court of law would provide little opportunity for obtaining a
satisfactory remedy.
After all, the time, expense, and great difficulty of proving a misappropriation
claim under these circumstances is the primary appeal of the arbitration agency
proposed herein. State laws protecting trade secrets already have been heavily
criticized by the Senate Judiciary Committee for not providing cost-effective
remedies.23'
What State law there is protects proprietary economic information
only haphazardly. The majority of States have some form of civil
remedy for the theft of such information--either adopting some
version of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, acknowledging a tort for
the misappropriation of the information, or enforcing various
contractual arrangements dealing with trade secrets. These civil
remedies, however, often are insufficient. Many companies chose
to forgo civil suits because the thief is essentially judgment
In addition, companies
proof... or too difficult to pursue ....
often do not have the resources or the time to bring suit. They also
frequently do not have the investigative resources to pursue a case.
Even if a company does bring suit, the civil penalties often are
business and the stolen
absorbed by the offender as a cost of doing
2 32
information retained for continued use.

23' See S. REP. No. 104-359 (1996).
232

d
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Where a playbook misappropriation dispute involves the theft, bribery,
disclosure, or unauthorized use of an actual team playbook, the panel could
provide a more limited ruling. Issues of how a playbook was stolen, obtained, or
disclosed from within a team organization may be more appropriate questions for
impartial fact finders in a court of law. Moreover, issues pertaining to breach of
an employment agreement or third party transfer or receipt of playbook
information would surely require a more thorough fact-finding process.
Resolving these issues would likely entail the admission of third party statements,
presentation of witnesses, and determination of credibility. An arbitration panel
might be ill-equipped to resolve the intricacies of those disputes. Instead, the
panel could provide a preliminary ruling based on any impartial investigation it
conducts after receiving a complaint. This ruling might serve as prima facie
evidence in further litigation proceedings.
For the resolution of individual play espionage though, this panel would
provide significant benefits to a victimized party by reducing the costs, time, and
uncertainty of achieving an appropriate remedy. Since misappropriation of a
playbook is not necessarily the same as misappropriation of individual plays, this
dual system of legal protection, bolstered by an independent governing agency,
would be quite advantageous. The ability to obtain an efficient, satisfactory
monetary remedy would go a long way toward deterring future unethical behavior
while simultaneously providing compensation to injured organizations.
VI. CONCLUSION: PLAYBOOKS DESERVE TRADE SECRET
PROTECTION AS A MATER OF PUBLIC POLICY

Certainly, the above proposal only scratches the surface of the many details
that such a system would ultimately entail, but the appeal of a practical approach
to trade secret enforcement lies in the ability to provide a remedy for the violation
of rights. The existence of a system that provides compensation for misappropriation of trade secrets is far more important than the detailed functioning of the
system. The arbitration agency proposed herein is desirable because it could deter
misconduct within sports industries and provide just compensation. The
improper acquisition, disclosure, or espionage of playbook information carries
quite an enticing reward. The secrets behind a team game plan are most valuable
and the potential monetary benefit is substantial. Although little documented
evidence of widespread espionage in professional sports presently exists, the
current "lure of impropriety" is immense.

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2016

39

Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 11, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 12

J. INTELL PROP. L[.

[Vol. 11:149

A. THE REMEDY FOLLOWS THE POLICY

Critics who may disagree with the provision of civil remedies for trade secret
misappropriation would likely argue that criminal statutes can provide a more
effective deterrent for trade secret espionage. 3 In their opinion, the threats of
high fines and prison sentences are adequate without the imposition of civil
remedies. 214 An example of such a criminal statute is the Economic Espionage
Act ("EEA").2 President Bill Clinton signed the EEA into law on October 11,
1996, in response to nationwide studies which revealed that nearly twenty-four
billion dollars of corporate property was stolen each year.236 The EEA created
two new federal criminal offenses involving (1) the theft of trade secrets by
foreign government agents or instrumentalities and (2) general protection from
domestic trade secret theft by anyone. 237 The Act "was passed to fll a large hole
in trade secret law that had been enlarged by the emergence of new information
technologies" such as sophisticated electronic eavesdropping equipment."35 The
Act's overall purpose was "to provide greater protection for the proprietary and
economic information of both corporate and governmental entities from foreign
as well as domestic theft and subsequent use."' "n Prior to the EEA's passage,
most federal trade secret theft cases were prosecuted under the Interstate
Transportation of Stolen Property Act,2" which was neither designed nor
intended to apply to intellectual property.24 Because of the lack of a federal
mostly based on some variation of the UTSA, were
statute, various state laws,
242
utilized to fill the gap.
Critics might argue that the general criminal trade secrets provision of the
EEA, section 1832,3 provides any necessary remedy for sports playbook
misappropriation. After all, this section broadly applies to anyone who knowingly

" See Mason et al., The Economic EspionageAct: A New FederalRegime of Trade Secret Protection,79

J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 191 (1997) (discussing the benefits of federal legislation which
criminalizes misappropriation); 18 U.S.C. S 2511 (discussing criminal provisions governing the
interception and disclosure of wire, oral, or electronic communications).
' Mason et al., hlera note 233, at 191.
23s

18 U.S.C. S2511 (2000).

J. Michael

Chanblee, Annotation, Vaid

I of Economic
, Construction, and Appication of Title

EspionageAct of 1996, 177 A.L.R. FED. 609,617 (2002) (referring to HEFFERNAN &SWARTWOOD,
TRENDS IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY Loss 4, 15 (1996)).
2"See Spencer Simon, The Economic EpionageAct of 1996, 13 BERKELEYTECH. L.J. 305 (1998).
238 Id.
9 Chamblee, supra note 236, at 617.
2'

0 Simon, supra note 237, at 305-06 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 2314-15 (2000)).
Id at 306.

242 Id
243

18 U.S.C. § 1832 (2000).

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol11/iss1/12

40

Ferrelle: Combating the Lure of Impropriety in Professional Sports Industri

2003)

PLAYBOOKS AS TRADE SECRETS

engages in the theft of trade secrets, or an attempt or conspiracy to do so."
However, such criticism may be unfounded. The EEA appears to suffer from
two crucial drawbacks. First, the statute probably would not apply to misappropriation of sports playbooks because these trade secrets are related to the
provision of public entertainment. Second, to the extent the EEA could be used
to prosecute criminally playbook theft, the Act fails to address adequately
the
245
monetary loss victims sustain as a result of the misappropriation.
The EEA does not protect trade secrets related to services. 246 Because trade
secrets must be embodied in a product in the stream of commerce, protection is
limited if the trade secret relates to a rendering of services rather than a produced
ware that contains or uses the secret. 47 Thus, since the use of professional sports
playbooks involves the provision of entertainment services, the EEA may not
even allow a prosecution for misappropriation of these trade secrets.
Second, even if the EEA could be used to combat playbook misappropriation,
the statute does not provide any civil remedies for the victimized parties. 24" All
fines and forfeitures go to the government, and the only compensatory remedy
available under federal law is the possibility that the victims may be able to
petition the government for restitution.249 Barring this, the only recourse for
trade secret misappropriation victims is filing an action under state civil law,
which can be prohibitively expensive and often ineffective in substantially
compensating the injured party for real losses sustained." ° Hence, the arbitration
agency proposed herein is advantageous because it would serve as a practical

24 See id Under section 1832, a defendant first must intend to convert a trade secret "to the
economic benefit of anyone other than the owner thereof," including the defendant. Second, under
this section, the defendant must intend or know that the offense will injure an owner of the trade
secret. Third, the Act requires that the trade secret be "related to or included in a product that is
produced for or placed in interstate or foreign commerce." Id The punishment includes
imprisonment for up to ten years, and/or a fine of up to five million dollars assessed against guilty
organizations. Id
245 Id
246

18 U.S.C. § 1832(a) (2000) (trade secrets must be "related to or included in aprduct that is

produced for or placed in interstate or foreign commerce") (emphasis supplied).
247Simon, supra note 237, at 315.
24 Chamblee, supra note 236, at 631 ("Private entities lack standing to assert civil actions
under.. . the [EEA].'). See Mason et al., spra note 233, at 202-03 (fines assessed to guilty parties
under the EEA are retained by the government. Because heavy fines are likely to impoverish a
defendant, restitution may be precluded, thereby leaving a victim business uncompensated.
Therefore, such fines could render a civil, companion-trial moot.). Butsee 18 U.S.C. §1838 (declaring
that the EEA does not preempt other civil actions, such as state tort or contract claims regarding
trade secret misappropriation).
249 Simon, spranote 237, at 316.
25"Id (arguing that the EEA should be specifically amended to correct this oversight, and that

federal law should adequately address the losses sustained by victims of trade secret theft).
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compromise between the underutilized ERA criminal provisions of section 1832
and the inefficient remedies of UTSA civil litigation.
B. PRACTICALITY PREVAILS

The central policy behind trade secret law is to deter breach of faith and
reprehensible means of learning another's trade secret."' Recognition of
playbooks as trade secrets would further this goal. With respect to enforcement
of the rights arising under trade secret law, an incentives-based approach of
deterrence and compensation would preserve the integrity of the sport, as trade
secret misconduct becomes less enticing and playbook creativity takes precedence.
Industry incentives would sway in favor of coaching, teaching, studying, and
developing.5 2 Playbooks could remain the true product of a coach's genius and
creativity. Stealing plays, bribing third parties, and espionage tactics become less
attractive in light of a credible threat of immense monetary damages.
Trade secret laws could thus inspire greater awareness of ethical conduct in
professional sports, where businesses of profit, exploitation, and corruption are
discouraged, and games of entertainment, integrity, and pure competition are
adored. Sports could remain what they were always meant to be-a good faith
battle of competitive spirit arising from the ingenuity of resilient participants. So
what are we waiting for?
RICE FERRELLE

2

Samuels &Johnson, .rmpra note 2, at 55.

252 See Das, supra note 59, at 1098 (with assurances that intellectual property law would protect

their creations, "coaches would develop new plays with greater regularity, knowing that they would
have an advantage in doing so").
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